By Jens Petersen

China’s foreign exchange policy and capital controls have been highly controversial
over the last decade. Whether the discussion centers on the apparent undervaluation of
the Renminbi (RMB) or the stringent control of currency flowing in and out of China, it
seems quite certain that these issues will continue to receive considerable attention in the
foreseeable future.

Amidst the controversy and accusations, what is often overlooked or ignored are the
great efforts already made to internationalize the RMB. China has gradually increased
the convertibility of its currency over the last decade as it pledged it would do upon
joining the World Trade Organization in 2001. In fact, it is true at this very moment that
companies can engage in limited trade, hedging and even cross border trade settlement in

The Status Quo: Currency Controls
Very few people will be surprised to learn that China keeps a firm grip on currency flows
in and out of the country. However, the severity is highly dependent on whether the
currency flows are associated with a current account or a capital account.

A current account in China includes categories such as the sale of goods, provision
of services, interest payments, and repatriation of dividends. For domestic Chinese
companies, foreign currency received by such means may be retained or sold to
financial institutions permitted to engage in foreign currency conversion; whereas, on
the other hand, foreign companies receiving profits in RMB may convert them into
foreign exchange through a process by which certification is obtained from the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).

Foreign exchange restrictions on the capital account items, however, are far stricter.
In broad terms, any transaction whose purpose is to create or transfer capital will be
regarded as a capital account item. Examples of such items include foreign direct
investment (FDI), outbound direct investment (ODI), cross-border or cross-currency
loans, capital markets investments, and derivative transactions.

Foreign companies interested in FDI must obtain approval through SAFE and other
Chinese government authorities and may thereafter inject capital into their China-based
entities and operations. Chinese investors interested in ODI must obtain approval from
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of Commerce,
among other agencies, and are then permitted to invest abroad.

International capital markets investors may invest in domestic Chinese capital markets
only through Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII). Domestic Chinese are
permitted to invest in global capital markets only by means of Qualified Domestic

Institutional Investor (QDII).

These restrictions present some serious obstacles to capital markets participants and
corporate investors. On the one hand, it may be rather difficult for foreigners to gain
exposure to Chinese capital markets, and, on the other hand, global companies may
face intriguing challenges when seeking to hedge their exposure to the RMB. While
such challenges can only be truly overcome when there is a freely convertible RMB, the
Chinese government has already initiated measures that in part may solve the problem.

Hong Kong as Proving Ground
Because of its position as a global financial center and strong legal framework, Hong
Kong has time and again served as a laboratory for China’s newest financial and currency
policies. This was the case in 2003 when the Chinese government sought to develop an
offshore RMB-market as part of the currency’s internationalization process.

RMB transactions began in 2004 with an arrangement that allowed Hong Kong banks
to develop an offshore deposit market for RMB. In 2007 the Chinese government took
another major step in liberating its capital accounts when it allowed companies to issue
RMB denominated debt in Hong Kong – the so-called “Dim Sum Bonds”.

Although Hong Kong’s offshore market allowed both non-Chinese individuals and
companies to own RMB, the Chinese currency still had a long way to go before it could
claim to be truly convertible. A very strenuous approval process was required to transfer
the offshore RMB back into Mainland China. In fact, because of these stringent capital
controls, the Chinese government had effectively fostered and developed two parallel
markets for the RMB, the onshore RMB market and the offshore RMB market.

Another milestone was reached in 2009, when a pilot program allowed cross-border trade
to be settled in RMB. Initially, this program only included the Chinese cities of Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Dongguan, the territories of Hong Kong and Macau,
and the ASEAN countries. The program was gradually expanded, and in 2012 all Chinese
provinces were permitted to conduct international, cross-border trade as long as the
Chinese participant had obtained an import-export qualification in its business license.

The pilot program for the cross-border settlement of RMB complemented the bilateral
currency swaps that China had signed with selected partner countries after December
2008. Essentially, these swap agreements allowed foreign governments to offer local
importers RMB financing when purchasing Chinese goods. Among the countries that
have entered into these RMB swap agreements are Japan, Russia, Singapore, Australia,
Hong Kong, and Brazil.

The bilateral currency swap agreements with national trading partners, the cross-
border trading program for Chinese companies, and the offshore RMB-market are very
important steps forward toward the ultimate goal of liberating the RMB.

Cross Border Arbitrage

At present foreign and domestic companies can access the RMB-debt markets in both
Hong Kong and Mainland China through the issuance of Dim Sum and Panda bonds
respectively. They can also conduct cross-border transactions, and they can trade in RMB
offshore with minimum restrictions. So how come there are two different RMB markets
with separate quotations?

Again the issue relates back to China’s stringent capital controls. Corporations will have
a natural incentive to buy RMB in the cheapest market and sell them in the priciest,
which will limit the divergence between the domestic Yuan (CNY) and the offshore
Yuan (CNH). However, as transactions can only be conducted against the background of
approved corporate activity, there is no clean cut arbitrage relationship between the two

Thus, as long as the cross-border arbitrage can be based on current account items such
as trade and profit repatriation, companies can move RMB relatively easily across the
Chinese border and potentially take advantage of the spread between the two markets.

However, the cross-border arbitrage becomes difficult to implement when transaction
relates to China’s capital accounts. Under normal circumstances it takes two or three
months for a foreign company to inject new capital into a Mainland China foreign-
invested entity and the process may potentially be extended by another month when the
capital to be injected comes in the form of offshore RMB. Investors have to undergo a
similarly cumbersome process when funds are transferred through the QFII and QDII

Thus, for non-Chinese companies and individuals the capital controls do not put severe
restrictions on the currency flow out of the country; the problem is rather getting capital
into the country.

The Impossible Trinity
But why does it have to be so complicated? Why bother to establish offshore RMB hubs?
Wouldn’t it be more feasible simply to remove the capital controls? The answer to these
questions can be traced back to what economists have dubbed “The Impossible Trinity”.
Ideally a country’s central bank would like to be able to (1) fix a country’s exchange rate,
(2) allow a free capital flow, and (3) lead an independent monetary policy. However, in
praxis this is hardly possible and the central bank will have to forfeit one of these three
items. While countries such as the United Kingdom and United States of America largely
have relinquished their exchange rate controls to maintain free movement of capital and
an autonomous monetary policy, the Chinese government chose to sacrifice the free
cross-border flow of capital to keep a fixed exchange rate and control money supply.

The Impossible Trinity also highlights the connection between China’s recent moves to
lessen capital controls while expanding the daily trading band of the RMB. China may
be at a point where it needs to let capital flow more freely in order to facilitate a more
efficient distribution. A prime example in this regard is the country’s overheated real
estate market, where considerable amounts of Chinese have put their savings due to the

lack of alternative investment options. Allowing Chinese companies and individuals to
invest more freely abroad could not only help China to deflate some of the domestic asset
bubbles, but could also deliver some of the much needed capital for struggling western
economies like the ones of Europe.

Furthermore, if Chinese investors and enterprises were less constrained with regards to
outbound investments, the People’s Bank of China – China’s central bank – would be
less dependent on buying US treasury bonds and could thereby more easily diversify
its holdings into other asset classes. The extra outbound investments would most likely
cause the RMB to depreciate against the Dollar. In fact, this process may already have
begun, as China’s stock of outbound investments continues to increase while its foreign
exchange reserves slowly are starting to decline. This development has so far been
accompanied by two percent depreciation of the USD/RMB exchange rate since the
beginning of May 2012.

China may have a long way to go before it can claim a truly international currency.
Meanwhile, the primary obstacles to convertibility are associated with capital accounts
restrictions and lack of access to the Chinese capital markets. The ability to raise capital
and hedge risk is consequently restricted. Arguably the offshore RMB financing services
in Hong Kong and elsewhere are fit to aid companies raising capital to be injected in
Mainland entities or to settle trade. Hong Kong also provides sophisticated services to
manage risk.

Besides a US Dollar settled non-deliverable CNY forward market, Hong Kong also offers
deliverable USD-CNH forwards, swaps and foreign exchange options. The interest rate
risk can be managed through CNH interest rate swaps or alternatively through cross-
currency swaps that under normal circumstances provide higher liquidity. Hypothetically,
this means that companies with access to both markets potentially may benefit from the
interest differentials.

While the process of liberating the country’s capital account has been rather slow, it
seems imminent that capital flows in and out of China will be less constrained in the near
future. Looser capital controls and a less constricted RMB exchange rate may in fact
not only turn into a win-win situation for China, but also for the global community as a

Source: China Briefing


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